Majority judgment vs. majority rule

Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki ()
Additional contact information
Rida Laraki: CNRS, University of Paris Dauphine-PSL, Lamsade

Social Choice and Welfare, 2020, vol. 54, issue 2, No 12, 429-461

Abstract: Abstract The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on evaluating candidates—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparing candidates—lead to another method, majority judgment, that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of “polarized” candidates. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation.

Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-019-01200-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Majority Judgment vs Majority Rule (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:54:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-019-01200-x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01200-x

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().