Political Economy of growth and poverty in Burkina Faso: Power, Institutions and Rents

Estelle Koussoubé, Augustin Loada, Gustave Nebié and Marc Raffinot
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Augustin Loada: UJZK - Université Joseph Ki-Zerbo de Ouagadougou = University of Ouagadougou
Gustave Nebié: UNICEF - WHO

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Abstract: This paper is an attempt to assess the relevance of the use of the North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) framework to explain the performances of Burkina Faso in terms of economic growth and development. The political history of Burkina Faso has been very unstable until president Campaoré took power in 1987. Since then, the stability has been based on low intensity violence, with bursts of open violence like those of the mutinies of 2011. This "stability" is based on the balance of power between two main "elite" groups, the army and the traditional chiefs. Trade unions, the Catholic Church and Donors also play a role, especially in case of trouble. The political class in power and its cronies are extracting rents by creating de facto monopolies, which enables them to tame violence, to a certain extent. The paradox is that the Burkinabe economy is growing steadily (GDP per capital grew at an average 1.5 per cent rate since independence), rather smoothly in the medium run – one of the best records in West-Africa. Because of high inequality, this impressive growth is far from inclusive.

Keywords: Political economy; Croissance à long terme; Economie politique; Institutions; Ordre social à accès limité; Burkina Faso; Limited Access Order; Long term growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03-14
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Working Paper: Political Economy of growth and poverty in Burkina Faso: Power, Institutions and Rents (2014)
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