The Incentive Properties of Collective Reputation

Pierre Fleckinger (), Wanda Mimra and Angelo Zago
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Wanda Mimra: ETH Zürich - Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology [Zürich]

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Abstract: We build a model of collective reputation under moral hazard to analyze incentives under collective reputation. Producers can produce high quality, but it is only imperfectly detected. Products not detected as of high quality are pooled by to the collective reputation structure. Collective reputation can yield higher quality and welfare than individual reputation. While groups unravel in absence of transfers even when efficient, simple collective reputation contracts implement the First Best.

Keywords: Quality; Collective Reputation; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Working Paper: The Incentive Properties of Collective Reputation (2017)
Working Paper: The Incentive Properties of Collective Reputation (2017)
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