The Incentive Properties of Collective Reputation
Wanda Mimra and
Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association
We build a model of collective reputation under moral hazard to analyze incentives under collective reputation. Producers can produce high quality, but it is only imperfectly detected. Products not detected as of high quality are pooled by to the collective reputation structure. Collective reputation can yield higher quality and welfare than individual reputation. While groups unravel in absence of transfers even when efficient, simple collective reputation contracts implement the First Best.
JEL-codes: D82 D47 D71 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-hrm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168283
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().