Evolutionarily stable preferences

Ingela Alger

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: The 50-year old concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) provided a key tool for theorists to model ultimate drivers of behavior in social interactions. For decades economists ignored ultimate drivers and used models in which individuals choose strategies based on their preferences-a proximate mechanism for behavior-and the distribution of preferences in the population was taken to be fixed and given. This article summarizes some key findings in the literature on evolutionarily stable preferences, which in the past three decades has proposed models that combine the two approaches: individuals inherit their preferences, the preferences determine their strategy choices, which in turn determines evolutionary success. One objective is to highlight complementarities and potential avenues for future collaboration between biologists and economists.

Date: 2023-01-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03929518v1
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-03929518v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Evolutionarily stable preferences (2023)
Working Paper: Evolutionarily stable preferences (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03929518

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().