Evolutionarily stable preferences

Ingela Alger

No 22-144, IAST Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST)

Abstract: The 50-year old definition of an evolutionarily stable strategy provided a key tool for theorists to model ultimate drivers of behavior in social interactions. For decades economists ignored ultimate drivers and used models in which individuals choose strate-gies based on their preferences. This article summarizes some key findings in the literature on evolutionarily stable preferences, which in the past three decades has proposed models that combine the two approaches: Nature equips individuals with preferences, which deter-mine their strategy choices, which in turn determines evolutionary success. The objective is to highlight complementarities and potential avenues for future collaboration between biologists and economists.

Date: 2022-09-01, Revised 2022-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Evolutionarily stable preferences (2023)
Working Paper: Evolutionarily stable preferences (2023)
Working Paper: Evolutionarily stable preferences (2022)
Working Paper: Evolutionarily stable preferences (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:iastwp:127262

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