Political Predation and Economic Development

Jean-Paul Azam (), Robert H. Bates and Bruno Biais ()
Additional contact information
Robert H. Bates: Harvard University
Bruno Biais: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We analyze a game between citizens and governments, whose type (benevolent or predatory) is unknown to the public. Opportunistic governments mix between predation and restraint. As long as restraint is observed, political expectations improve, people enter the modern sector, and the economy grows. Once there is predation, the reputation of the government is ruined and the economy collapses. If citizens are unable to overthrow this government, the collapse is durable. Otherwise, a new government is drawn and the economy can rebound. Consistent with stylized facts, equilibrium political and economic histories are random, unstable, and exhibit long-term divergence.

Date: 2009-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04418857v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-04418857v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: POLITICAL PREDATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2009)
Working Paper: Political Predation and Economic Development (2009)
Working Paper: Political Predation and Economic Development (2009)
Working Paper: Political Predation and Economic Development (2009)
Working Paper: Political Predation and Economic Development (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04418857

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().