Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail ?

David Martimort and Jérôme Pouyet
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Jérôme Pouyet: CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Pay-TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit. Such an exclusive allocation of rights emerges as a robust equilibrium outcome but may fail to maximize welfare. We analyze whether a ban on resale and a ban on package bidding may improve welfare. These corrective policies have no impact on the final allocation but lead to profit redistribution along the value chain.

Keywords: Upstream and downstream competition; Exclusivity; Broadcasting rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12-16
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04841128v1
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Related works:
Working Paper: Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? (2024)
Working Paper: Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? (2024)
Working Paper: Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? (2022)
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