Matching disadvantaged children to day care: Evidence from a centralized platform

Olivier De Groote and Minyoung Rho

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We use data from a platform that centralizes day care matching and estimate parents' preferences and nursery priorities from rank-ordered lists and acceptance decisions. Our novel estimation approach, inspired by dynamic discrete choice models, accounts for strategic behavior. We then evaluate centralized matching policies, comparing mechanisms and assessing the effects of subsidies, increased capacity, and affirmative action. We find that affirmative action is key to increasing participation of disadvantaged children, though it can raise segregation due to strong differences in preferences.

Keywords: day care; affirmative action; segregation; centralized matching markets; CCP estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02-27
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04948625v2
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Related works:
Working Paper: Matching disadvantaged children to day care: Evidence from a centralized platform (2026)
Working Paper: Matching Disadvantaged Children to Day Care: Evidence from a Centralized Platform (2024)
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