Matching disadvantaged children to day care: Evidence from a centralized platform

Olivier De Groote and Minyoung Rho

No 24-1600, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We use data from a platform that centralizes day care matching and estimate parents’ preferences and nursery priorities from rank-ordered lists and acceptance decisions. Our novel estimation approach, inspired by dynamic discrete choice models, accounts for strategic behavior. We then evaluate centralized matching policies, comparing mechanisms and assessing the effects of subsidies, increased capacity, and affirmative action. We find that affirmative action is key to increasing participation of disadvantaged children, though it can raise segregation due to strong differences in preferences.

Keywords: day care; affirmative action; segregation; centralized matching markets; CCP estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 D82 I24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12, Revised 2026-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-des
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Related works:
Working Paper: Matching disadvantaged children to day care: Evidence from a centralized platform (2026)
Working Paper: Matching Disadvantaged Children to Day Care: Evidence from a Centralized Platform (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:129960

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