Taxation of early retirement windows and delaying retirement: the French experience

Pierre-Jean Messe

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper investigates the e ect of the 2003 French pension reform on hiring, ring and employment rates among older workers. This reform increased the mandatory retirement age and simultaneously it set a tax levied on early retirement windows payed by rms to their older workers, to encourage them to leave their job early. We use a matching model with endogenous job destruction extended to account for a mandatory retirement age and we calibrate the model with data drawn from the French Labor Force Surveys for the years 2001 and 2002. We show that in the case of a high tax rate, delaying retirement raises job separation rates, which partially o sets its positive e ect on job nding rates. Consequently, the combination of an increase in the retirement age and a taxation on early retirement windows may have perverse e ects on the employment rate among older workers.

Keywords: delaying retirement; erly retirement windows; matching models; employment protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00809758v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00809758v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Taxation of early retirement windows and delaying retirement: The French experience (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00809758

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().