Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion
Giuseppe Attanasi,
Claire Rimbaud and
Marie Claire Villeval ()
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Claire Rimbaud: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Marie Claire Villeval: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Working Papers from HAL
Abstract:
Donors usually need intermediaries to transfer their donations to recipients. A risk is that donations can be embezzled before they reach the recipients. Using psychological game theory, we design a novel three-player Embezzlement Mini-Game to study whether intermediaries suffer from guilt aversion and whether guilt aversion toward the recipient is stronger than toward the donor. Testing the predictions of the model in a laboratory experiment, we show that the proportion of guilt-averse intermediaries is the same irrespective of the direction of the guilt. However, structural estimates indicate that the effect of guilt on behaviour is higher when the guilt is directed toward the recipient.
Keywords: Embezzlement; Dishonesty; Guilt Aversion; Psychological Game Theory; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01-15
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Related works:
Journal Article: Embezzlement and guilt aversion (2019) 
Working Paper: Embezzlement and guilt aversion (2019) 
Working Paper: Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion (2018) 
Working Paper: Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion (2018) 
Working Paper: Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion (2018) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01981632
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