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Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion

Giuseppe Attanasi (), Claire Rimbaud and Marie Claire Villeval ()

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Abstract: Donors usually need intermediaries to transfer their donations to recipients. A risk is that donations can be embezzled before they reach the recipients. Using psychological game theory, we design a novel three-player Embezzlement Mini-Game to study whether intermediaries suffer from guilt aversion and whether guilt aversion toward the recipient is stronger than toward the donor. Testing the predictions of the model in a laboratory experiment, we show that the proportion of guilt-averse intermediaries is the same irrespective of the direction of the guilt. However, structural estimates indicate that the effect of guilt on behaviour is higher when the guilt is directed toward the recipient.

Keywords: Psychological Game Theory; Embezzlement; Dishonesty; Guilt Aversion; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-upt
Date: 2018-04-26
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01779145
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Working Paper: Embezzlement and guilt aversion (2019)
Working Paper: Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion (2019)
Working Paper: Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion (2018) Downloads
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