Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: An experiment
Adam Zylbersztejn (),
Zakaria Babutsidze and
Nobuyuki Hanaki ()
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Adam Zylbersztejn: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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We experimentally investigate how much value people put in observable information about others in strategic interactions. The incentivized experimental task is to predict an unknown target player's trustworthiness in an earlier hidden action game. In Experiment 1, we vary the source of information about the target player (neutral picture, neutral video, video containing strategic content). The observed prediction accuracy rates then serve as an empirical measure of the objective value of information. In Experiment 2, we elicit the subjective value of information using the standard stated preferences method ("willingness to accept"). While the elicited subjective values are ranked in the same manner as the objective ones, subjects attach value to information which does not help predict target behavior, and exaggerate the value of helpful information.
Keywords: Prediction; observable information; individual characteristics; stated preferences; willingness to accept; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Working Paper: Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: an experiment (2020)
Working Paper: Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: An experiment (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02420074
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