Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: An experiment

Adam Zylbersztejn, Zakaria Babutsidze and Nobuyuki Hanaki

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, vol. 170, issue C, 268-285

Abstract: We experimentally investigate how much value people put in observable information about others in strategic interactions. The incentivized experimental task is to predict an unknown target player’s trustworthiness in an earlier hidden action game. In Experiment 1, we vary the source of information about the target player (neutral picture, neutral video, video containing strategic content). The observed prediction accuracy rates then serve as an empirical measure of the objective value of information. In Experiment 2, we elicit the subjective value of information using the standard stated preferences method (“willingness to accept”). While the elicited subjective values are ranked in the same manner as the objective ones, subjects attach value to information which does not help predict target behavior, and exaggerate the value of helpful information.

Keywords: Prediction; Observable information; Individual characteristics; Stated preferences; Willingness to accept; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: an experiment (2020)
Working Paper: Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: An experiment (2020)
Working Paper: Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: An experiment (2020)
Working Paper: Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: An experiment (2019)
Working Paper: Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: An experiment (2019)
Working Paper: Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: An experiment (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:170:y:2020:i:c:p:268-285

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.009

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