Learning from arbitrage

Lionel Boisdeffre
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Lionel Boisdeffre: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CATT - Centre d'Analyse Théorique et de Traitement des données économiques - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour

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Abstract: We extend the refinement of information process presented in [3] to a model with uncountably many states of nature. This setting has the larger scope. It encompasses, in particular, the model of [3], where agents may have private information, and the model of [5], where they have private information, anticipations and beliefs. With no price model a la Radner (1972, 1979), and even no price to be observed, we show how agents may always infer information from ?nancial markets, whenever required, and narrow down their anticipation sets, until all arbitrage is precluded.

Keywords: Anticipations; Inferences; Perfect foresight; Rational expectations; Financial markets; Asymmetric information; Arbitrage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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