DEALING WITH VENTURE CAPITALISTS: SHOPPING AROUND OR EXCLUSIVE NEGOTIATION
Catherine Casamatta and
Carole Haritchabalet ()
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Carole Haritchabalet: CATT - Centre d'Analyse Théorique et de Traitement des données économiques - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour
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Abstract:
We study the optimal negotiation strategy of an entrepreneur who faces two investors with pri-vate information about his project's profitability. The entrepreneur derives a private benefit ofcontrol so that he cares not only about expected monetary profits, but also about the probabilityto obtain financing. If he contacts both venture capitalists simultaneously, the entrepreneur ob-tains high expected monetary profits. If he commits to a period of exclusive negotiation with oneventure capitalist, he can increase the probability to obtain financing for riskier projects, but dealterms deteriorate. The optimal negotiation strategy results from this trade-off. We also solve forthe equilibrium financial contracts and obtain implications for venture capitalists' portfolios andentrepreneurs' deals. The model predicts in particular that venture capitalists are more likely tofinance projects with equity-like claims when projects are riskier and venture capitalists are moreexperienced. Also, high private benefit entrepreneurs are more likely to receive a single offer andto be financed by less experienced venture capitalists.
Keywords: deal flow; exclusive negotiation; venture capital; start-up financing; informed investors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-pau.hal.science/hal-02938912v1
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Related works:
Journal Article: Dealing with Venture Capitalists: Shopping Around or Exclusive Negotiation (2014) 
Working Paper: DEALING WITH VENTURE CAPITALISTS: SHOPPING AROUND OR EXCLUSIVE NEGOTIATION (2013) 
Working Paper: Dealing with Venture Capitalists: Shopping Around or Exclusive Negotiation (2011) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpcatt:hal-02938912
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