Take the good with the bad, and the bad with the good? An experiment on pro-environmental compensatory behaviour

Sophie Clot (), Gilles Grolleau and Lisette Ibanez ()
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Sophie Clot: UOR - University of Reading
Gilles Grolleau: ESSCA - ESSCA – École supérieure des sciences commerciales d'Angers = ESSCA Business School
Lisette Ibanez: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier

CEE-M Working Papers from CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro

Abstract: To what extent are people subject to moral licensing? Rather than just examining moral licensing and cleansing at an aggregate level, we investigate experimentally the moral dynamics at a disaggregated level. Using a combination of two symmetric games (i.e. Giving and Taking games), we found that aggregate results occult heterogeneity that can be used to improve policy performance. Overall, half of the participants adopts compensatory behaviour. Compensatory behaviour is not necessarily directly related to the first decision, but is mainly explained by individuals' characteristics as well as the framing of the games. Men are, in general, more consistent than women, however when they adopt licensing, the extent of compensation is far more important than for women. Highly environmentally concerned individuals are more generous than less environmentally concerned individuals, and also compensate more frequently. The framing of the donation game impacts first donations, and moreover impacts the type of inconsistency people might adopt. We suggest that policymakers can improve policy performances by avoiding a ‘one-size-fits-all management' and tailoring their approaches according to this heterogeneity of moral dynamics.

Keywords: cleansing; dictator game; licensing; moral in(consistency); taking game. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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