To Be Good or To Be Better: Asset Managers Attitudes Towards Herding

Torben Lütje
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Torben Luetje ()

Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) from Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät

Abstract: Based on a questionnaire survey the paper distinguishes between herding asset managers who try to be good and non-herding asset managers who try to be better than their competitors. It provides evidence for reputational herding and discusses herding managers\\\' working effort, preferred sources of information and investment horizon. Additionally, their risk taking behavior including their investment behavior in short-term tournament scenarios is analyzed. It is found that herding managers assess themselves as generally more risk averse than non-herding managers, but in the tournament they are willing to take more risk. This finding is ascribable to their fear of falling out of the herd.

Keywords: Institutional investors; herding; risk aversion; tournament hypothesis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2004-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-cfn
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