Bringing Tax Avoiders to Light: Moral Framing and Shaming in a Public Goods Experiment
Stefanos A. Tsikas and
Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) from Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
With a series of public goods games in a 2x2-design, we analyze two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. Cooperation increases when non-contributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance. However, cooperation is only durable when free-riders are "shamed" by disclosing their misdemeanor. We find shaming effects to be strong enough to make appeals to morality redundant for participants' decisions.
Keywords: shaming; framing; tax avoidance; public goods experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 H26 H30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mac, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-633
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