Preemptive Horizontal Mergers: Theory and Evidence
Jozsef Molnar ()
No 213, CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
This paper proposes an explanation of why it can be rational for the profit-maximizing managers of an acquiring firm to conduct a takeover, even when doing so reduces shareholder value. If a firm fears that one of its rivals will gain competitive advantage from taking over some third firm, i can be rational for the first firm to preempt this merger with a takeover attempt of its own. This attempt can be optimal even if it requires the first firm to “overpay” relative to the increase in the joint profits of the combined firms. The paper first presents a model formalizing the above intuition. Then an event study is conducted to test the preemption theory. The empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the preemption theory, as opposed to the alternatives of hubris and agency theories.
Pages: 47 pages
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Pre-emptive horizontal mergers: theory and evidence (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:has:discpr:0213
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nora Horvath ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).