EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions

László Kóczy ()

No 820, CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Abstract: While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the in-dices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.

Keywords: Banzhaf index; Shapley-Shubik index; a priori voting power; rational players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2008-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econ.core.hu/file/download/mtdp/MTDP0820.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to econ.core.hu:80 (A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond.)

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Strategic power indices: quarrelling in coalitions (2006) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:has:discpr:0820

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nora Horvath ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

 
Page updated 2024-07-16
Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:0820