Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions

László Kóczy ()

No 803, Working Paper Series from Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management

Abstract: While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the indices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.

Keywords: Banzhaf index; Shapley-Shubik index; a priori voting power; rational players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2006-05, Revised 2008-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions (2008)
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