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Core stability and core-like solutions for three-sided assignment games

Ata Atay () and Marina Núñez ()

No 1806, IEHAS Discussion Papers from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Abstract: In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in this case, we first focus on other notions of stability such as the notions of subsolution and von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case where each sector of the market has two agents. Furthermore, for any three-sided assignment market, we prove that the union of the extended cores of all µ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching µ, is the core with respect to those allocations that are compatible with that matching, and this union is always non-empty.

Keywords: Assignment game; core; subsolution; von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-hpe
Date: 2018-03
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