Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts

Bettina Klaus () and Markus Walzl

No 09-046, Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School

Abstract: We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting sets of stable allocations for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from obtaining "set inclusion results" on all three domains, we introduce weak setwise stability as a new stability concept and prove that for substitutable preferences the set of pairwise stable matchings is nonempty and coincides with the set of weakly setwise stable matchings. For strongly substitutable preferences the set of pairwise stable matchings coincides with the set of setwise stable matchings.

Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Matching with Contracts; Pairwise Stability; Setwise Stability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C78 D78 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2007-08, Revised 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-046.pdf Revised version, September 2008 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts (2009)
Working Paper: Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-046

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