Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts

Bettina Klaus () and Markus Walzl

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2009, vol. 45, issue 7-8, 422-434

Abstract: We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting sets of stable allocations for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from obtaining "set inclusion results" on all three domains, we introduce weak setwise stability as a new stability concept and prove that for substitutable preferences the set of pairwise stable matchings is nonempty and coincides with the set of weakly setwise stable matchings. For strongly substitutable preferences the set of pairwise stable matchings coincides with the set of setwise stable matchings.

Keywords: Many-to-many; matching; Matching; with; contracts; Pairwise; stability; Setwise; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts (2008)
Working Paper: Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:7-8:p:422-434

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