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Games of Threats

Elon Kohlberg () and Abraham Neyman ()
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Elon Kohlberg: Harvard Business School, Strategy Unit

No 18-023, Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School

Abstract: A game of threats on a finite set of players, N, is a function d that assigns a real number to any coalition, S ? N, such that d(S) = -d(N\S). A game of threats is not necessarily a coalitional game as it may fail to satisfy the condition d(Ø) = 0. We show that analogs of the classic Shapley axioms for coalitional games determine a unique value for games of threats. This value assigns to each player an average of the threat powers, d(S), of the coalitions that include the player.

Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2017-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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