# Games of Threats

Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman ()

Abstract: A game of threats on a finite set of players, $N$, is a function $d$ that assigns a real number to any coalition, $S \subseteq N$, such that $d \left( S \right) = - d \left( N \setminus S \right)$. A game of threats is not necessarily a coalitional game as it may fail to satisfy the condition $d \left( \emptyset \right) = 0$. We show that analogs of the classic Shapley axioms for coaltional games determine a unique value for games of threats. This value assigns to each player an average of the threat powers, $d \left( S \right)$, of the coalitions that include the player.

Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2017-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp710.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Games of Threats (2017)
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