Games of Threats
Elon Kohlberg and
Abraham Neyman ()
Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem
A game of threats on a finite set of players, $N$, is a function $d$ that assigns a real number to any coalition, $S \subseteq N$, such that $d \left( S \right) = - d \left( N \setminus S \right)$. A game of threats is not necessarily a coalitional game as it may fail to satisfy the condition $d \left( \emptyset \right) = 0$. We show that analogs of the classic Shapley axioms for coaltional games determine a unique value for games of threats. This value assigns to each player an average of the threat powers, $d \left( S \right)$, of the coalitions that include the player.
Pages: 10 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Games of Threats (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp710
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