Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model

Anders Poulsen ()

No 01-3, Working Papers from University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyses preference evolution in a bargaining situation. We show

that preferences for reciprocity, that sustain a conflict-free outcome, are viable

if players have enough information about opponents’ preferences. However, depending

on the initial starting point, preference evolution can in general both

enhance or reduce subjective and material welfare, relative to the situation where

all players have the usual materialistic preferences.

Keywords: Preference evolution; Reciprocity; Altruism; Materialism; Subjective and material eciency; Bargaining; Indirect evolutionary approach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2001-03-19
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Related works:
Working Paper: Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:aareco:2001_003

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