Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model
Anders Poulsen ()
No 01-3, Working Papers from University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper analyses preference evolution in a bargaining situation. We show
that preferences for reciprocity, that sustain a conflict-free outcome, are viable
if players have enough information about opponents’ preferences. However, depending
on the initial starting point, preference evolution can in general both
enhance or reduce subjective and material welfare, relative to the situation where
all players have the usual materialistic preferences.
Keywords: Preference evolution; Reciprocity; Altruism; Materialism; Subjective and material eciency; Bargaining; Indirect evolutionary approach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2001-03-19
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http://www.hha.dk/nat/WPER/01-3_ap.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:aareco:2001_003
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