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On Entry Deterrence and Imperfectly Observable Commitment

Anders Poulsen ()

No 01-14, Working Papers from University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics

Keywords: Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2001-01-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:aareco:2001_014

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