Economics at your fingertips  

Are There Fast Tracks in Economic Departments? Evidence from a Sample of Top Economists

Valerie Smeets ()

No 04-4, Working Papers from University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the timing of promotions in academic departments. Contrary to previous attempts in the empirical literature, we test alternative theories of fast tracks by adding a measure of performance in our analysis. We find that learning from past performance is an important factor to explain the time spent as assistant and associate professor. In addition, our analysis shows the existence of a handicapping policy: individuals who had a fast promotion in the past are less likely to be promoted quickly again. We also find that the handicap is relative, that it does not survive the whole career and that it is possible for these individuals to beat it if they achieve a given level of productivity. We interpret our find- ings as evidence that incentives and sorting matter in academia and that using relative handicaps can help to balance these two concerns. Finally, we look at the productivity pattern of individuals with different career profiles and find that fast tracks are always more productive than their pairs, even after the last promotion, what suggests an effective selection process.

Keywords: Fast track; Incentives; Sorting; Productivity; Economic departments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J41 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2004-05-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to (No such host is known. )

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics The Aarhus School of Business, Prismet, Silkeborgvej 2, DK 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Helle Vinbaek Stenholt (). This e-mail address is bad, please contact .

Page updated 2020-01-26
Handle: RePEc:hhs:aareco:2004_004