National versus international mergers in unionised oligopoly
Kjell Lommerud (),
Odd Rune Straume and
Lars Sørgard ()
No 12/03, Working Papers in Economics from University of Bergen, Department of Economics
We analyse how the presence of trade unions affects the pattern of mergers in an international oligopoly and the welfare implications thereof. We find that an international merger results in lower wages for all firms. A national merger results in higher wages, highest for the non-merging firms. Using a model of endogenous merger formation, we find that the equilibrium market structure, if it exists, always implies one or more international mergers. Unless products are close substitutes there are more mergers than socially preferred.
Keywords: Endogenous merger; Merger policy; Welfare; Trade unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
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Journal Article: National versus international mergers in unionized oligopoly (2006)
Working Paper: National versus International Mergers in Unionised Oligopoly (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:bergec:2003_012
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