National versus International Mergers in Unionised Oligopoly

Sørgard, Lars and Kjell Lommerud ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Odd Rune Straume and Lars Sørgard

No 4040, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We analyse how the presence of trade unions affects the pattern of mergers in an international oligopoly and the welfare implications thereof. We find that an international merger results in lower wages for all firms. A national merger results in higher wages, highest for the non-merging firms. Using a model of endogenous merger formation, we find that the equilibrium market structure, if it exists, always implies one or more international mergers. Unless products are close substitutes there are more mergers than socially preferred.

Keywords: Endogenous merger; Merger policy; Welfare; Trade unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP4040 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: National versus international mergers in unionized oligopoly (2006)
Working Paper: National versus international mergers in unionised oligopoly (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4040

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP4040

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().