The impact of anticipated discussion on cooperation in a social dilemma
Sigve Tjøtta (),
Therese Kobbeltvedt () and
Anders Molander ()
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Therese Kobbeltvedt: Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Department of Strategy and Management, Postal: Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
Anders Molander: Center for the Study of Professions, Oslo University College, Postal: St. Olavs plass, 0130 Oslo, Norway
No 11/08, Working Papers in Economics from University of Bergen, Department of Economics
We study the impact of anticipated face-to-face discussions among group members after they have made an anonymous contribution to a public good in an experimental setting. We find that the impact of anticipated discussions depends on how we frame the public good game. When framed in non-evaluative language, anticipated ex post discussions lead to a sharp reduction in contributions to the public good. This effect reversed when evaluative language was used to underscore normative expectations. In contrast, there was no framing in the no-discussion baseline version of our game. We offer an explanation that centres on the idea that the announcement of ex post discussions reinforces both normative and predictive expectations.
Keywords: Public Goods; Laboratory; Individual Behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:bergec:2008_011
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