Teams punish less
Heike Auerswald (),
Marcel Thum () and
No 08/13, Working Papers in Economics from University of Bergen, Department of Economics
Many decisions in politics and business are made by teams rather than by single individuals. In contrast, economic models typically assume an individual rational decision maker. A rapidly growing body of (experimental) literature investigates team decisions in different settings. We study team decisions in a public goods contribution game with a costly punishment option and compare it to the behavior of individuals in a laboratory experiment. We also consider different team decision-making rules (unanimity, majority). We find that teams contribute significantly more and punish less than individuals, regardless of the team decision rule. Overall, teams yield higher payoffs than individuals.
Keywords: Group Decision Making; Public Good; Experiment; Punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H54 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-exp
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Working Paper: Teams Punish Less (2013)
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