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Offshoring of Services and Corruption: Do Firms Escape Corrupt Countries?

Patrik Karpaty and Patrik Tingvall

No 243, Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation from Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze how the offshoring of services by Swedish firms is affected by corruption in target economies. Taking stance from the gravity model of trade, we analyze how the choice of country, volume and composition of offshored services is affected by the presence of corruption in target economies. The results suggest that corruption is a deterrent for service offshoring. Firms avoid corrupt countries, and corruption reduces the amount of offshored services. In addition, the sensitivity to corruption is highest for poor countries, and large and internationalized firms are the ones that tend to be the most sensitive to corruption. Given the importance of large firms as international investors and subcontractors, this adds yet another argument for fighting corruption.

Keywords: Corruption; Services; Offshoring; Gravity model; Firm level data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 D21 F23 L24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2011-03-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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https://static.sys.kth.se/itm/wp/cesis/cesiswp243.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Offshoring of Services and Corruption: Do Firms Escape Corrupt Countries? (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Offshoring of Services and Corruption: Do Firms Escape Corrupt Countries? (2012) Downloads
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