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Offshoring of Services and Corruption: Do Firms Escape Corrupt Countries?

Patrik Karpaty and Patrik Tingvall

No 192, Ratio Working Papers from The Ratio Institute

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze how the offshoring of services by Swedish firms is affected by corruption in target economies. The results suggest that firms avoid corrupt countries and that corruption reduces the amount of offshored services. In addition, the sensitivity to corruption is highest for poor countries, and large and internationalized firms are the ones that tend to be the most sensitive to corruption.

Keywords: Corruption; Services; Offshoring; Gravity model; Firm level data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 D22 F23 L24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2012-05-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur and nep-int
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Related works:
Working Paper: Offshoring of Services and Corruption: Do Firms Escape Corrupt Countries? (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Offshoring of Services and Corruption: Do Firms Escape Corrupt Countries? (2011) Downloads
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