Anyone for Higher Speed Limits? - Self-Interested and Adaptive Political Preferences

Olof Johansson-Stenman () and Peter Martinsson

No 95, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: Swedish survey-evidence indicates that variables reflecting self-interest are important in explaining people’s preferred speed limits, and that political preferences adapt to technological development. Drivers of cars that are newer (and hence safer), bigger, and with better high-speed characteristics, prefer higher speed limits, as do those who believe they drive better than average, whereas elderly people prefer lower limits. Furthermore, people report that they themselves vote more sociotropically than they believe others to vote, on average. Self-serving biases are proposed as a bridge between subjectively perceived expressive and sociotropic voting behavior, versus objectively self-interested voting behavior.

Keywords: Speed limits; self-interested voting; expressive voting; sociotropic voting; selfserving bias; adaptive political preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2003-03-28
Note: Publised in Public Choice, 2005, Vol. 122, pp. 319-331.
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Johansson-Stenman, Olof and Peter Martinsson, 'Anyone for Higher Speed Limits? - Self-Interested and Adaptive Political Preferences' in Public Choice, 2005, pages 319-331.

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