Trust, Trust Games and Stated Trust: Evidence from Rural Bangladesh
Olof Johansson-Stenman (),
Minhaj Mahmud and
No 166, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics
Levels of trust are measured by asking standard survey questions on trust and by observing the behaviour in a trust game using a random sample in rural Bangladesh. Follow-up questions and correlations between the sent amount in the trust game and stated expectations reveal that the amount sent in the trust game is a weak measure of trust. The fear of future punishment, either within or after this life, for not being sufficiently generous to others, was the most frequently stated motive behind the respondents’ behaviour, highlighting the potential importance of motives that cannot be inferred directly from people’s behaviour.
Keywords: Trust; trust game; social capital; field experiment; Bangladesh (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ltv
Note: Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
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Published as Johansson-Stenman, Olof, Minhaj Mahmud and Peter Martinsson, 'Trust, Trust Games and Stated Trust: Evidence from Rural Bangladesh' in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2013, pages 286-298.
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Journal Article: Trust, trust games and stated trust: Evidence from rural Bangladesh (2013)
Working Paper: Trust, Trust Games and Stated Trust: Evidence from Rural Bangladesh (2006)
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