Trust, Trust Games and Stated Trust: Evidence from Rural Bangladesh

Olof Johansson Stenman, Minhaj Mahmud and Peter Martinsson
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Olof Johansson Stenman: Göteborg University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Olof Johansson-Stenman ()

No KERP 2006/11, Keele Economics Research Papers from Centre for Economic Research, Keele University

Abstract: Levels of trust are measured by asking standard survey questions on trust and by observing the behaviour in a trust game using a random sample in rural Bangladesh. Follow-up questions and correlations between stated expectations and the sent amount in the trust game reveal that the amount sent in the trust game is a weak measure of trust. The fear of future punishment, either during or after this life, for not being sufficiently generous to others, was the most frequently stated motive behind the respondents' behaviour, highlighting the potential importance of motives that cannot be inferred directly from people's behaviour.

Keywords: Trust; trust game; social capital; motivations; Bangladesh. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2006-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-cbe, nep-cwa, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
Note: An earlier version of this paper is available as Working Paper No 168, Department of Economics, Göteborg University, 2005.
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Related works:
Journal Article: Trust, trust games and stated trust: Evidence from rural Bangladesh (2013)
Working Paper: Trust, Trust Games and Stated Trust: Evidence from Rural Bangladesh (2005)
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