Enforcement of Exogenous Environmental Regulations, Social Disapproval, and Bribery
Håkan Eggert () and
Godwin Kofi Vondolia ()
No 392, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics
Many resource users are not directly involved in the formulation and enforcement of resource management rules and regulations in developing countries. As a result, resource users do not generally accept such rules. Enforcement officers who have social ties to the resource users may encounter social disapproval and possible social exclusion from the resource users if they enforce regulations zealously. The officers, however, may avoid this social disapproval by accepting bribes. In this paper, we present a simple model that characterizes this situation and derives results for situations where officers are passively and actively involved in the bribery.
Keywords: Natural resource management; bribery; law enforcement; social exclusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q20 Q28 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-reg and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Enforcement of exogenous environmental regulation, social disapproval and bribery (2009)
Working Paper: Enforcement of Exogenous Environmental Regulations, Social Disapproval, and Bribery (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0392
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ann-Christin Räätäri Nyström ().