Enforcement of Exogenous Environmental Regulations, Social Disapproval, and Bribery
Håkan Eggert () and
Godwin Kofi Vondolia ()
Discussion Papers from Resources For the Future
Many resource users are not directly involved in the formulation and enforcement of resource management rules and regulations in developing countries. As a result, resource users do not generally accept such rules. Enforcement officers who have social ties to the resource users may encounter social disapproval and possible social exclusion from the resource users if they enforce regulations zealously. The officers, however, may avoid this social disapproval by accepting bribes. In this paper, we present a simple model that characterizes this situation and derives results for situations where officers are passively and actively involved in the bribery.
Keywords: natural resource management; bribery; law enforcement; social exclusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q20 Q28 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.rff.org/RFF/documents/EfD-DP-09-19.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.rff.org/RFF/documents/EfD-DP-09-19.pdf)
Journal Article: Enforcement of exogenous environmental regulation, social disapproval and bribery (2009)
Working Paper: Enforcement of Exogenous Environmental Regulations, Social Disapproval, and Bribery (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-09-19-efd
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Papers from Resources For the Future
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Webmaster ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).