EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Strategic Sophistication of Individuals and Teams in Experimental Normal-Form Games

Matthias Sutter (), Simon Czermak and Francesco Feri
Additional contact information
Simon Czermak: Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck

No 430, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in oneshot normal-form games. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their firstand second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often consistent by being a best reply to first order beliefs. We identify the complexity of a game and the payoffs in equilibrium as determining the likelihood of consistent behavior according to textbook rationality. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals.

Keywords: Strategic sophistication; beliefs; experiment; team decision making; individual decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 56 pages
Date: 2010-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-evo and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/2077/21888 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams in experimental normal-form games (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Strategic Sophistication of Individuals and Teams in Experimental Normal-Form Games (2010) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0430

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ann-Christin Räätäri Nyström ().

 
Page updated 2024-06-21
Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0430