Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment: Comment

Martin G. Kocker, Marc V. Lenz and Matthias Sutter
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Martin G. Kocker: University of Munich and University of Innsbruck
Marc V. Lenz: University of Cologne

No 439, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (forthcoming) report for a sample of 129 shootouts from various seasons in ten different competitions that teams kicking first in soccer penalty shootouts win significantly more often than teams kicking second. Collecting data for the entire history of six major soccer competitions we cannot replicate their result. Teams kicking first win only 53.4% of 262 shootouts in our data, which is not significantly different from random. Our findings have two implications: (1) Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta’s results are not generally robust. (2) Using specific subsamples without a coherent criterion for data selection might lead to non-representative findings.

Keywords: Tournament; first-mover advantage; psychological pressure; field experiment; soccer; penalty shootouts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2010-03-31
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://hdl.handle.net/2077/22201 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment: Comment (2010)
Working Paper: Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment: Comment (2010)
Working Paper: Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment: Comment (2010)
Working Paper: Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment: Comment (2010)
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