Giancarlo Spagnolo and
Martin Dufwenberg ()
Additional contact information
Martin Dufwenberg: University of Arizona, University of Gothemburg and CESifo, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721-0108, USA, http://www.u.arizona.edu/~martind1/
No 13, SITE Working Paper Series from Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
Harassment bribes - payments people give in order not to be denied what they are legally entitled to – are common in for example India. Kaushik Basu recently made a '’radical'’ proposal to reduce its occurrence: Legalize the act of giving the bribe and double the fine for accepting the bribe! We develop a formal model and delineate circumstances under which Basu’s proposal works well or poorly. We discuss a modified scheme where immunity is conditional on reporting that we argue addresses the main issues raised against the proposal. We highlight complementarities between these schemes and other policies aimed a improving the accountability and performance of the public sector, and of law enforcement agencies in particular. We conclude discussing the implications for the fight of more harmful forms of corruption.
Keywords: Bribes; Corruption; Governance; Immunity; Law enforcement; Leniency; Whistleblowers. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 K42 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2011-12-19, Revised 2013-05-12
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Legalizing Bribe Giving (2012)
Working Paper: Legalizing Bribes (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hasite:0013
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in SITE Working Paper Series from Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dominick Nilsson ().