Efficiency Wages and X-Inefficiencies

Tore Ellingsen

No 180, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: Within most organizations, agents may spend time on a variety of tasks, productive and redistributive. In this paper, I derive an optimal multi-task incentive scheme under the realistic assumption that agents have limited liability. The wage level is shown to increase with an agent's discretion and the organization's profits. With multiple agents, it is generally not optimal for the principal to fully eliminate distributional conflict within the organization. The resulting influence costs constitute a measure of X-inefficiency. The paper illuminates the relationship between competition and influence costs, emphasizing the role of the organization's production technology.

Keywords: Limited liability; Efficiency wages; Rent-seeking; X-inefficiency; Mergers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J41 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1997-08-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1997, pages 581-596.

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Journal Article: Efficiency Wages and X‐Inefficiencies (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0180

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