Monitoring and Pay

Magnus Allgulin and Tore Ellingsen
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Magnus Allgulin: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

No 245, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: The shirking model of efficiency wages has been thought to imply that monitoring and pay are substitute instruments for motivating workers. We demonstrate that this result hinges critically on restrictive assumptions regarding workers' choice of effort - for example that there are only two possible effort levels. Under more reasonable assumptions, monitoring and pay are complementary instruments. Another result is that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the wage level and the workers' rents. Finally, much of the empirical literature on the monitoring-pay relationship is shown to be seriously misguided.

Keywords: Monitoring; efficiency wages; incentive pay. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1998-06-16, Revised 1999-11-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Monitoring and Pay (2002)
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