Monitoring and Pay
Magnus Allgulin and
Tore Ellingsen ()
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Magnus Allgulin: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
No 245, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics
The shirking model of efficiency wages has been thought to imply that monitoring and pay are substitute instruments for motivating workers. We demonstrate that this result hinges critically on restrictive assumptions regarding workers' choice of effort - for example that there are only two possible effort levels. Under more reasonable assumptions, monitoring and pay are complementary instruments. Another result is that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the wage level and the workers' rents. Finally, much of the empirical literature on the monitoring-pay relationship is shown to be seriously misguided.
Keywords: Monitoring; efficiency wages; incentive pay. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 1998-06-16, Revised 1999-11-22
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Journal Article: Monitoring and Pay (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0245
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