Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model

Maria Saez-Marti and Jörgen Weibull

No 281, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: In the models of Young (1993a, b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myiopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably also do. We investigate this possibility in the context of Young's (1993b) bargaining model. It turns out that "cleverness" in this respect indeed does have an advantage in some cases. However, if all individuals are equally informed about past play, in a statistical sense, then the Nash bargaining solution remains the unique long-run outcome when the mutation rate goes to zero.

Keywords: Bargaining; evolution; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 1998-11-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo and nep-mic
Note: Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 1999, Vol 86, No 2.
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory , 1999, pages 268-279.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model (1999)
Working Paper: Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0281

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