Subordinates as Threats to Leaders

Amihai Glazer and Björn Segendorff
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Björn Segendorff: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

No 424, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: A leader of an organization may view a subordinate as threatening or weakening the leader's position. The threat may increase with the subordinate's ability and reduce the rents the leader wins. In particular, a leader who trains his subordinate reduces the cost to the owner of a firm in replacing the leader, and so reduces the leader's bargaining power. The leader therefore provides inefficiently low training for the subordinate.

Keywords: Leader; Subordinate; Threat; Training; Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2001-01-21
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Related works:
Working Paper: Subordinates as Threats to Leaders (2000)
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