Trust and truth
Tore Ellingsen (),
Magnus Johannesson (),
Jannie Lilja () and
Henrik Zetterqvist ()
Additional contact information
Jannie Lilja: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Postal: Uppsala University, P.O. Box 514, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Henrik Zetterqvist: Hilti
No 665, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics
In a laboratory experiment, we create relationships between pairs of anonymous subjects through a Prisoners' dilemma game. Thereafter the same subjects play a private values (sealed-bid double auction) bargaining game with or without communication. Communication substantially increases bargaining efficiency among subjects who cooperated in the Prisoners' dilemma, but has no significant effect on bargaining outcomes when one subject defected. Subjects who cooperated in the Prisoners' dilemma bid more aggresively if their opponent defected. Cooperators also lie more about their valuations when their opponent defected: Compared to the case of mutual cooperation, the cooperators' rate of honest revelation decreases from 64% to 6% and the rate of outright deception increases from 7% to 53%. Our results provide qualitatively new evidence that many people are strong recipricators: They are willing to bear private costs in order to reward good behavior and punish bad behavior, even when the rewards and punishments are unobservable.
Keywords: Bargaining; Communication; Honesty; Trust; Strong reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D74 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Trust and Truth (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0665
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Helena Lundin ().